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 Introduction 
 Violence is standardly defined as behaviour involving physical force 
intended to hurt, damage or kill. There is no stipulation that the victim 
and perpetrator cannot be identical. Indeed,  The World Report on Violence 
and Health is explicit that violence can be self-directed as well as other-di-
rected (Krug et al. 2002). Based on this inclusion , it is estimated that 50% 
of all deaths due to violence are self-inflicted, with 35% due to homicide 
and the remainder due to war or some other form of conflict (ibid.). 
Yet, to pick two illustrative examples, not one of the 41 chapters in  The 
Cambridge Handbook of Violent Behaviour and Aggression addresses self-di-
rected violence (Flannery et al. 2007), while the  International Handbook of 
Violence Research devotes only one out of 62 chapters to suicide (Heitmeyer 
and Hagan 2003). Such collections aim to be far reaching and compre-
hensive compilations of state-of-the-art research into violence. Why does 
self-directed violence garner so little attention? 
 One natural answer to this question is that, despite the recognition 
by the World Health Organization (WHO) that violence can be self-di-
rected, as a society we find it difficult to conceptualize self-harm and 
suicide as violence at all. One reason for this difficulty may be that our 
prototype of violence is other-directed. Think of violence, and the kinds 
of images that immediately spring to mind are likely to include fights, 
brawls, muggings, gang warfare, military warfare and perhaps sexual 
violence and the domestic abuse of women and children. But reflection 
on these images suggests a further reason for this difficulty, namely, that 
our prototype of the violent perpetrator is male. 
 Men are, indeed, perpetrators of more other-directed violence than 
women (Raine 2013). They are also almost twice as likely successfully 
 4 
 Self-Harm as Violence: When 
Victim and Perpetrator Are One 
 Hanna  Pickard 
OPEN
H. Marway et al. (eds.), Women and Violence
© The Editor(s) 2015
72 Hanna Pickard
to commit suicide than women (Krug et al. 2002). However, women 
are significantly more likely to attempt suicide than men (MHF 2007; 
Canetto and Sakinofsky 1998). The received explanation for this discrep-
ancy appeals to the lethality of the means typically chosen by men, such 
as hanging, as opposed to women, such as overdosing (Canetto and 
Sakinofsky 1998; Schrijvers 2012). In addition, although there is some 
evidence that rates of male self-harm are rising (Kerr et al. 2010), women 
appear significantly more likely to self-harm than men (NICE 2011). It 
is estimated that five to six times as many adolescent girls self-harm as 
compared to boys (Hawton et al. 2012), and rates of self-harm in prisons 
in England and Wales are ten times higher for female than male inmates 
(Hawton et al. 2014). Moreover, just as our prototype of other-directed 
violence appears to be male, our prototype of self-harm appears to be 
female. Think, for instance, of  Girl Interrupted, the film adaptation of 
Susanna Kaysen’s memoir of the same name, or of Elizabeth Wurtzel’s 
account of self-harm in her autobiography  Prozac Nation . 
 Hence, we may find it difficult to conceptualize self-harm and suicide 
as violence, not only because it is self-directed but equally because, unlike 
other-directed violence, it is associated in our society with women. As 
feminist theorists since Simone de Beauvoir have documented with 
painstaking detail, within contemporary culture, women are regarded 
as ‘the gentle sex’ (de Beauvoir 1949 [1989]). Aggression and violence in 
men is typically viewed as natural. Aggression and violence in women, 
in contrast, is typically viewed as unnatural – a violation of our collec-
tive cultural archetype of the ideal woman as a loving, nurturing, mother 
figure (Motz 2008). 
 This image of women as naturally non-aggressive and non-violent 
arguably affects our understanding of violence. On the one hand, it may 
bar us from recognizing the very existence of female-perpetrated other-
directed violence, making us blind to incidences in which women are 
perpetrators. This tendency may be reinforced by the fact that most female 
other-directed violence occurs in the private realm, directed towards 
parents, partners and children, where it can more easily remain outside 
of public view (Motz 2008). On the other hand, when we recognize the 
existence of female-perpetrated violence of any form, the archetype of 
the ideal woman as naturally non-aggressive and non-violent may cause 
us to pathologize it. We may view violence in women, whether directed 
towards self or towards others, as an indication of perversion, deviance 
and sickness – an abomination of female nature. 
 Suicide and self-harm are indeed associated with mental health prob-
lems, and so easily pathologized (MHF 2007). Of course, both can and 
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do occur outside of such contexts (Fincham et al. 2011). For instance, 
suicide may be a rational and dignified end-of-life choice for those who 
are terminally ill, or an act of political protest or moral or religious faith 
(Holroyd, this volume; Marway, this volume). Self-mutilation and the 
endurance of pain are a part of many religious, cultural and beautifica-
tion rituals (Favazza 1987). However, in the context of mental health 
problems, an association between suicide and especially self-harm and 
women may have a particularly strong impact on our understanding of 
the nature of such behaviour. On the one hand, we may barely recog-
nize it as violence at all. For our cultural assumption is that women 
are not violent. On the other hand, if we recognize it as violent, we 
may pathologize it as the very epitome of irrationality – as hysterical, 
emotional, incomprehensible behaviour. For, our cultural assumption is 
that, if women are violent, they are sick. 
 My aim in this chapter is to challenge this conception of suicide and 
especially self-harm, arguing that in central instances, it is on the one 
hand straightforwardly a form of violence, and, on the other, no more 
pathological than central instances of other-directed violence. Different 
people self-harm for different reasons, but given a realistic under-
standing of the psycho-socio-economic context which women who self-
harm typically face, it emerges as fully comprehensible behaviour – an 
instrumental means to ends that, given the context, we can understand 
why women would have. In other words, self-harm emerges as a form 
of, broadly speaking,  rational agency . As Anna Motz eloquently puts one 
component of this idea: ‘To deny female violence is to deny female 
agency’ (Motz 2008, 71). But to pathologize female violence is also to 
deny female humanity and rationality – to deny the way that aggression 
can be as natural for women to feel as it is for men, and that violence in 
women can function, as it does in men, not only to express aggression 
but also to serve various ends that embody clear and recognizable goods. 
This recognition is essential if we are to respond to self-directed violence 
in ways that are both effective and ethically appropriate. 
 The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I begin by 
describing the nature of self-harm in order to establish, lest it be doubted, 
that it is indeed a form of violence. I then compare self-directed and other-
directed violence, sketching the differences and similarities. Drawing on 
epidemiological data, clinical understanding and first-person reports, 
I outline the various functions self-harm has, revealing its meaning 
through an understanding of the reasons why people do it. As already 
noted, the psycho-socio-economic context in which self-harm typically 
occurs is very important to this account. With this non-pathological 
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understanding of self-harm as a form of violence in hand, I then turn in 
the final section to issues of agency, responsibility and ethics, sketching 
why and how we might hope to support and enable people to desist 
from self-harm, within clinical contexts and also through social and 
political agendas for change. I conclude by suggesting the need for a 
cultural shift, whereby we acknowledge that anger, aggression and the 
propensity for violence can exist in all of us, male and female, and so 
work together to fashion a culture that is able to better acknowledge and 
address this side of human nature. 
 Self-harm as violence 
 Self-harm, known also as self-injury, self-poisoning, self-mutilation and 
parasuicide, is not easy to define. The WHO defines it as ‘an act with 
non-fatal outcome, in which an individual deliberately initiates a non-
habitual behaviour that, without intervention from others, will cause 
self-harm, or deliberately ingests a substance in excess of the prescribed 
or generally recognised dosage’ (Kerkhof et al. 1994, 7). This defini-
tion aligns with common usage in its focus on the deliberate nature of 
self-harm, but is unusual in its claim that self-harm is a ‘non-habitual 
behaviour’ and will result in damage ‘without intervention from others’. 
Self-harm is often a habit – a repetitive pattern of behaviour. Indeed, 
some people self-harm daily. Moreover, it is unclear why an absence of 
intervention by others is part of the definition at all – as if the possi-
bility of self-harm depends fundamentally on such non-intervention, as 
opposed to depending fundamentally on the self-harmer’s own agency. 
 In stark contrast to the WHO definition, the UK National Institute 
for Clinical Excellence defines self-harm as ‘self-poisoning or self-in-
jury, irrespective of the apparent purpose of the act’ (NICE 2004, 2011). 
According to this definition, self-harm need not be deliberate. The moti-
vation for this removal of intent is in all likelihood a desire to accom-
modate forms of self-harm that stem from unconscious or unrecognized 
motives or impulses, or that may be foreseeable but not directly intended. 
This definition therefore widens the scope of self-harm so that it can 
potentially include, for instance, anorexia and other eating disorders, 
substance abuse, sexual behaviour that carries health risks or makes one 
vulnerable to sexual abuse or violence, and even, arguably, actions like 
getting into fights or playing contact sports, where there is significant 
risk of physical damage even if that is not the apparent purpose of the 
activity. 1 However, according to this definition, even genuine accidents 
that inadvertently result in self-injury but belie no unconscious motive 
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and could not have been foreseen will count as self-harm. The WHO 
definition is too narrow, but the NICE definition is too wide. 
 Rather than focusing on defining self-harm, let us consider its central 
instances. Prototypical forms of self-harm include cutting, scratching or 
burning the skin; smashing one’s body parts with weapons or banging 
them against walls; swallowing blades or sharp glass, or inserting them 
under the skin or in orifices; overdosing on illicit drugs, alcohol or 
prescribed medication, or ingesting poisons or toxic substances; tying 
ligatures around one’s neck; or hanging oneself, shooting oneself or 
throwing one’s body under trains, into oncoming traffic or off buildings. 
Some of these behaviours, of course, can also be forms of suicide. Suicide 
and self-harm can be distinguished in principle via intent: the intention 
in suicide is to die, while the intention in self-harm is not to die, but 
to damage or harm oneself. However, in reality the distinction between 
them is often unclear, with people unsure as to what they intend, or 
indifferent as to the outcome and reckless in method, so that self-harm 
can commonly and knowingly risk death, even if death is not the clear 
and conscious intention of the act. Indeed, self-harming behaviour is 
associated with a 50–100-fold increase in risk of suicide compared to the 
general population (NICE 2011). 
 Recall that violence is standardly defined as behaviour involving 
physical force intended to hurt, damage or kill. Although some of these 
prototypical forms of self-harm do not involve physical force, such as 
overdosing or ingesting poisons, most do. In central instances, self-harm 
is a form of behaviour directed at one’s own body, which uses physical 
force to deliberately cause hurt and damage, if not death. Indeed, if we 
imagine the actions prototypical of self-harm to be other-directed, the 
violence inherent in them is palpable and shocking. As with the NICE 
definition, we can choose to extend the idea of self-harm to behaviour 
that is less direct in its means or less deliberate in its intention to cause 
hurt or damage, by analogy with these central instances, if that would 
serve a theoretical or clinical use. There are also potentially both theo-
retical and ethical reasons for widening the scope of violence, so that it 
both includes psychological damage as an outcome and also recognizes 
threats and exercises of power as nonphysical but yet violent means of 
perpetrating hurt or damage, by coercively securing victim compliance 
(Krug et al. 2002). But such caveats aside, central instances of self-harm 
show that it is prototypically direct and deliberate behaviour involving 
physical force inflicted by a person onto their own body with the inten-
tion of causing hurt or damage and even possibly risking death: it is 
violence where victim and perpetrator are one. 
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 Why would any person, man or woman, do this to themselves? We 
commonly assume that, if a person can act so as to avoid harm to them-
selves, they do. Arguably, this is a basic assumption of our culture’s 
common sense or folk psychology – a reliable rule of thumb we use to 
explain and predict behaviour. But people who self-harm do precisely the 
opposite of this: they act to directly and deliberately harm themselves. 
Those of us who do not self-harm or have personal or professional expe-
rience with those who do may lack the resources to make sense of it. We 
may therefore find ourselves inclining to the view that the only way to 
understand self-harm is as an expression of pathology and irrationality. 
For, without an understanding of its functions, no sense can be made of 
why any person would do this  if they could help it . This line of thought 
helps underwrite the conception of self-harm as hysterical, emotional, 
incomprehensible behaviour – as if the self-directed violence typical of 
women is a kind of sickness. 
 Understanding self-harm in women 
 To challenge this conception, it is useful to begin by comparing self-
harm in women with our prototype of male-perpetrated other-directed 
violence. For it is not difficult for us to understand such other-directed 
violence as serving various functions. 2 In addition to the use of violence 
as a direct means to procuring material goods, violence fulfils multiple 
individual and interpersonal psychological purposes. Most straightfor-
wardly, especially male-on-male violence is often viewed as a natural 
masculine expression of an equally natural masculine aggression, 
stemming from emotions like anger or rage, arguably alongside fear 
of shame and vulnerability. Such male-on-male violence is often glori-
fied in popular culture and the media, and may be part of the fabric of 
an individual’s family and wider community, perhaps even necessary 
to survival and success within it. Even those of us who view violence 
as ethically unacceptable can understood the drive towards it, in the 
grip of aggressive impulses and strong emotions, within families and 
communities that endorse and expect it of men. 
 The ends served by other-directed violence include (but, of course, are 
not restricted to) the following:
 (1) Affect regulation. The expression, release and communication of 
aggressive impulses and strong emotions, especially anger. 
 (2) Social and/or interpersonal dominance and/or control and the various 
benefits it accrues, especially in conformity with cultural stere-
otypes of masculinity. 
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 (3) Revenge. Retaliation/retribution towards those who have perpetrated 
psychological and/or physical harm to the agent or someone they 
care about. 
 (4) Protection from future harm . Violence can signal a willingness to 
retaliate/seek retribution and so act as a deterrent, when directed 
towards those who have perpetrated past harm or are threatening 
to perpetrate future harm. 
 Other-directed violence that flows from strong emotions, like anger, 
rage, shame and fear, is not typically the result of  rational deliberation , 
understood as a conscious, reflective process of weighing the costs and 
benefits of various options, in order to decide what to do. But it is both 
typically  rational in the sense that it is an instrumental means to these 
various ends, as well as subject to choice and a degree of control. 3 The 
evidence for this is the classic ‘policeman at the shoulder’ test. Consider, 
for instance, a man who ‘sees red’ and routinely gets into conflicts and 
resorts to violence – except when in view of a policeman. On such occa-
sions, he is highly motivated not to lash out, which he would other-
wise do, lest he be detained and charged with common assault. The 
most natural understanding of this man’s behaviour is that he has 
the capacity to choose not to be violent and control his aggression – a 
capacity, of course, that he only exercises when sufficiently motivated 
to do so. There is a basic, common-sense distinction between what a 
person can do but won’t (because they don’t want to) as opposed to 
what a person wants to do but can’t (because they lack the capacity). In 
so far as other-directed violence is responsive to incentives, it appears to 
be subject to choice and a degree of control. Exercising this capacity and 
desisting from violence would therefore seem to be, in general, some-
thing people can do but sometimes don’t, as opposed to something they 
want to do but can’t. Very broadly, this is why we are typically inclined 
to view perpetrators of violence as  rational agents whom it is appropriate 
to hold responsible and to account. 4 
 However, it is extremely important to recognize how difficult it may 
be for people to exercise the capacity to desist from other-directed 
violence, especially when it is culturally expected if not indeed glori-
fied, and in addition serves ends which, given the context and internal 
and external resources available, people may lack genuine or perceived 
alternative means of achieving. For example, insofar as other-directed 
violence offers affect regulation – a way of releasing, communicating 
and acting on strong emotions – refraining from it may require a person 
to undergo emotional distress and bear feelings of, for example, extreme 
anger, rage, anger, shame and fear, unless and until alternative ways of 
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managing these strong emotions are learned. Men who have grown up in 
a cultural context which supports male aggression and violence as a way 
of managing emotions may have had little opportunity to learn other 
ways of dealing with these feelings. If so, although they retain choice 
and a degree of control when violent, we may yet feel these circum-
stances demand that we show them understanding and compassion, 
and offer help with emotional management, even if we are not prepared 
to excuse the violence. Equally, the general presumption that violence 
is subject to choice and a degree of control may, of course, be defeated 
in particular circumstances. Perhaps sometimes a person who ‘sees red’ 
becomes so angry that something ‘boils over’ or ‘snaps’ and choice and 
control is lost – they are not then able to stop the flow driving them 
towards violence. In such circumstances, if indeed a variety of compli-
cated conditions are met, we may feel that the person ought to be (at 
least in part) excused, for they are not, in the moment, possessed of 
rational agency, but driven by forces they cannot control. 5 But impor-
tant as these caveats are, our basic cultural understanding of (especially 
male-on-male) other-directed violence is that it is expressive of rational 
agency: a means towards ends that are evidently desirable or valuable 
in our cultural context, and, although driven by strong emotions, yet 
subject to choice and a degree of control. No matter how much we may 
deplore it, we have ample cultural and folk psychological resources to 
make good sense of other-directed violence. 
 Although our cultural and folk psychological resources are less able to 
help us make sense of self-directed violence, it in fact serves remarkably 
similar ends to other-directed violence. Understanding its functions 
requires in the first instance contextualizing the behaviour, by appreci-
ating the associated risk factors. These include (Hawton et al. 2012) the 
following: 
 Sociodemographic and educational factors: female sex; low socio-(1) 
economic status; lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender orienta-
tion; restricted educational achievement; exposure to self-directed 
violence through peer group. 
 Psychiatric and psychological factors: mental disorder, especially (2) 
personality disorder, depression, anxiety and ADHD; drug and 
alcohol misuse; impulsivity; low self-esteem; poor social problem 
solving; social isolation; perfectionism; hopelessness. 
I ndividual negative life events and family adversity: parental sepa-(3) 
ration, divorce, discord, mental disorder or death; family history 
of suicide; interpersonal difficulties, especially childhood bullying; 
adverse childhood experiences, including a history of physical and, 
especially in women, sexual abuse. 6 
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 Women at risk of self-harm have typically come from underprivileged 
backgrounds of poor opportunity, and may have sexual orientations 
which make them vulnerable to ongoing social ostracization, discrimi-
nation, and violence. They are likely to have had difficult childhoods 
without good family or peer relationships and support, during which 
they may well have experienced emotional neglect, and physical and 
especially sexual victimization and abuse. As adults, they may struggle 
with mental health, and drug and alcohol problems, and have problems 
with relationships. Their educational and employment opportunities 
may be limited. And their self-esteem and self-worth are likely to be 
poor. In addition, like men who have been brought up in communities 
that fail to support nonviolent modes of male anger management, such 
women are also unlikely to have had the opportunity to learn positive 
ways of managing strong and difficult emotions and experiences during 
childhood, and may therefore lack both inner and outer resources for 
dealing effectively with them as adults. 
 Women who find themselves in this kind of psycho-socio-economic 
context will, of course, have very many good reasons for feeling anger 
and rage, both towards particular individuals and the world at large. 
They may also be subject to the shame and fear that is often associated 
with victimhood and sexual abuse in particular, and potentially to have 
internalized the negative attitudes towards them such mistreatment 
represents. Especially in a cultural context in which female aggression 
and violence are deemed unnatural, women cannot easily express or 
communicate their anger, rage or negative self-directed attitudes, or act 
publicly on their aggressive impulses, without violating gender expec-
tations and norms. They may, therefore, turn these impulses inward 
onto their own bodies, enacting them in a private realm in which they 
can be kept hidden from public view. 
 It is important to emphasize that people self-harm for different reasons, 
but clinical understanding and patient self-reports reveal self-harm as 
serving at least six ends that, with this psycho-socio-economic back-
ground in mind, help explain why people engage in this behaviour. 7 
 Self-directed ends of self-harm:
(1)  Affect regulation . Like violence towards others, self-harm is a way 
of managing strong emotions, perhaps especially anger, rage and 
shame. It can offer relief in various ways: by distracting from 
emotional pain by replacing it with physical pain and/or releasing 
endorphins; by providing a way of expressing, releasing and acting 
on anger and aggression; or, in contrast, by allowing people to  feel 
something in the face of dissociation and emotional numbing. In 
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other words, self-harm can offer short-term relief from negative 
emotional experience of various forms: it is a coping mechanism. 
 (2)  Self-punishment . Women who have internalized the negative attitudes 
towards them represented by a history of mistreatment typically have 
extremely low self-esteem and self-worth, and often at some level 
believe they are bad and deserve to be harmed. Self-harm can be both 
expressive of and explained by such negative self-directed attitudes. 
 Other-directed ends of self-harm:
 (3)  Communication . Self-harm can be a way of communicating internal 
distress by symbolizing emotions in concrete, physical form: ‘the 
public expression of ... private pain’ (Adshead 1997, 11). People who 
come from backgrounds of psycho-socio-economic adversity may 
struggle to identify and talk about their feelings. Self-harm offers a 
powerful way of demonstrating what they are going through, and, 
potentially, thereby seeking care and help. 
 (4)  Other-punishment . It is natural, for women as much as for men, to 
feel anger and rage, and want to be aggressive and violent, towards 
those who have harmed either them or those whom they care 
about. Self-harm can offer a safe way of expressing such emotions 
and impulses, when violence towards others is deemed unaccept-
able. This function of self-harm correlates with the experience of 
being attacked that self-harm can provoke in others, as it becomes 
like a symbolic weapon, turning anger towards others inwards on 
the self, while yet communicating this anger to them. 
 Self-directed and other-directed ends of self-harm:
 (5)  Control . Self-harm can create a sense of empowerment and control 
by establishing ownership over one’s own body in face of the experi-
ence of being helpless and violated. This function may be especially 
important for those with a history of childhood physical and sexual 
abuse. For people whose bodies have been harmed by others, it can be 
an act both of reclaiming their body and, to use Anna Freud’s concept 
(1936 [1992]) of identification with the perpetrator, establishing that 
it is they, and no one else, who now has dominance and control. 
 A desire for death:
 (6)  The continuum with suicide. When associated with mental health 
problems, the desire to kill oneself is typically understood as 
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expressive of hopelessness and despair – a desire for permanent 
escape from the suffering of living. In contrast, self-harm offers 
short-term relief, and hence, as Anna Motz has eloquently argued, 
can be seen instead as an act of hope (Motz 2009b) – an affirmation 
of life. However, as already noted in the previous section , although 
the idea of suicide is distinguished from self-harm by nature of 
intent – to die rather than to do harm or damage – in reality the 
distinction between them is often unclear. Self-harm regularly and 
knowingly risks death, due to indifference or recklessness, even if it 
does not clearly and consciously aim at it. 
 Self-harm is a response to psycho-socio-economic adversity and trauma, 
in a cultural context in which aggression and violence in women – what 
we might in men consider a natural response to such adversity and 
trauma – is deemed unnatural. Within this context, self-harm can func-
tion as a means to ends we can understand why women would have, such 
as feeling relief from anger, rage, shame and negative emotional expe-
riences more generally, expressing and communicating, seeking care, 
attacking or punishing those perceived to have done wrong (including 
themselves, via internalization of the negative attitudes expressed 
through their past mistreatment), and gaining a sense of power and 
control in the face of feelings of helplessness and violation. 
 Like other-directed violence that flows from strong emotions, self-
 directed violence is not typically the result of rational deliberation. 
But it is typically both rational in the sense that it is an instrumental 
means to these various ends, as well as subject to choice and a degree 
of control. The evidence for this, again as with other-directed violence, 
is that, despite the extreme difficulty in desisting from self-directed 
violence, especially in the absence of genuine or perceived alternative 
means of achieving the various ends it fulfils, women who self-harm 
may choose not to do so when self-harm would conflict with other ends 
they value more . To take a common example, the classic ‘policeman at 
the shoulder test’ can here be transposed to a ‘child at the shoulder test’ 
when, for instance, women who self-harm ensure that their children 
never witness their self-directed violence, out of care and concern for 
the impact it would have on them. Another kind of example regularly 
occurs when women stop ‘cold turkey’ as a condition of joining a therapy 
group, much along the model of support groups for addiction, such as 
Alcoholics Anonymous. 8 Hence self-directed violence in women, like 
other-directed violence in men, is not an expression of pathology but 
an expression, at least in good part, of  rational agency: a means to ends 
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we can understand why women who have suffered adversity, trauma 
and abuse would have, and subject to choice and a degree of control. 
Consider, in this light, the following first-person report:
I needed to kill something in me, this awful feeling like worms 
tunneling along my nerves. So when I discovered the razor blade, 
cutting, if you’ll believe me, was my gesture of hope. All the chaos, 
the sound and fury, the confusion and uncertainty and despair – all 
of it evaporated in an instant and I was for that minute grounded, 
coherent, whole. Here is the irreducible self. I drew the line in the 
sand, marked my body as mine, its flesh and its blood under my 
command. 9 
 It is a harrowing indictment of our society that women suffer such adver-
sity, trauma and abuse, and are possessed of so few genuine or perceived 
alternative options, that they choose to be violent towards themselves as 
a way of coping with and expressing their experience. Unlike violence 
towards others, we do not typically view self-directed violence as morally 
wrong, nor, since the legalization of suicide, is it criminalized. 10 But it 
does violate a basic tenet of any broadly liberal society, which is that 
respect and equality are ideally due to all persons, irrespective of who 
they are. 11 The very universality of this tenet means that, from each of 
our perspectives, it must apply not only to others but also to ourselves. 
Women who self-harm seem not to treat themselves with the respect 
and equality that, given this ethical outlook, they along with all other 
persons are due. Situating self-harm within its psycho-socio-economic 
context can help explain why women treat themselves and their bodies 
with such disregard and brutality: part of the explanation is that this may 
be how they and their bodies have been treated by others. Effectively and 
ethically addressing self-harm therefore has two interwoven facets. One 
facet looks to the rational agency of the self-harmer herself, and the need 
to support and empower her to choose self-care over self-harm. The other 
facet looks to the context of suffering, adversity and oppression in which 
women are situated, and the need to change the ways they are treated in 
wider society and the options available to them. 
 Agency, ethics, and the validation and tolerance of anger 
 Alongside the tendency to pathologize self-harm and deny the self-
harmer’s rational agency is a corresponding tendency to treat her only as 
a victim, helpless and out of control, possibly rendered hysterical by her 
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emotions. But women who self-harm are rational agents of self-directed 
violence – they are not only victims. Effective clinical interventions and 
other forms of interpersonal engagement aimed at self-harm cessation 
must acknowledge that women who self-harm do so for reasons, and 
have choice. For they need to exercise their control and choose to do 
things differently in order to stop – by deciding to resist the desire to 
self-harm, find alternative ways to fulfil the ends it serves, and, in addi-
tion, question and challenge some of the more self-denigrating ends 
self-harm may serve and express. When the desire to self-harm is present 
and the behaviour habitual, cessation almost invariably requires the 
exercise of rational agency: broadly speaking, women must choose self-
care over self-harm. 
 But clinical interventions that acknowledge a person’s rational agency 
inevitably carry a risk. In this case, the risk is that in acknowledging 
and working with women as agents of self-harm, clinicians may end 
up judging and blaming the self-harmer for her actions, and experi-
encing or expressing a range of critical, negative attitudes and emotions. 
Despite the fact that self-harm is neither criminalized nor intuitively 
viewed as morally wrong, it is, after all, a form of violence, and it can 
have a profound impact on other people, especially when it is perceived 
as an expression of anger and rage, or a symbolic attack. Rational agency 
carries the (defeasible) assignment of responsibility, and it can be an 
easy slide from an acknowledgement of agency and (potentially) respon-
sibility, to blaming attitudes and emotions, such as disapproval, dislike, 
rejection, contempt, disgust and anger – as if ‘the problem’ lies funda-
mentally with the self-harmer herself. 
 To be effective, clinical engagement must acknowledge agency and 
(potentially) responsibility, while at the same time avoiding blame and 
maintaining care, concern and respect for women who self-harm. A 
blaming atmosphere is likely to re-enact and reinforce past mistreatment 
and its impact on women, destroying the possibility of building trust 
and understanding. In contrast, a stable environment that maintains 
care, concern and respect potentially offers women a corrective experi-
ence, ideally helping them overcome the impact of past mistreatment 
on their self-esteem and self-worth, through therapeutic relationships 
that validate them and their experiences, and consistently and authen-
tically show compassion and positive regard. In such environments, 
women may feel supported and empowered to stop self-harming, and 
embark on a process of freeing themselves from past mistreatment and 
learning new ways of managing feelings and caring for themselves. 12 
Given the extent of past mistreatment, this may be a long and painful 
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process, requiring women to have the courage to face traumatic aspects 
of their past in order to develop a narrative understanding of its impact 
on their present, thereby enabling them to identify patterns and make 
changes to improve their lives. 13 
 There are many features of the clinical environment that help avoid 
any inclination to blame that may arise, and to maintain care, concern 
and respect. In this regard, it is undoubtedly crucial that the basic clin-
ical aim is to help patients, and that this aim structures clinical prac-
tices, roles and relationships, shaping a culture of care. But this culture 
is also aided by an awareness of the psycho-socio-economic past and 
present context of women who self-harm. Attention to this context is 
necessary in any case to the development of a narrative understanding 
of the person and to the facilitation of realistic change. But it also acts 
as an antidote to any inclination to blame, undercutting it directly by 
situating self-harm in relation to underprivileged psych-socio- economic 
contexts, and thereby forcing it to exist alongside the attitudes and 
emotions that recognition of such inequality and injustice engenders. 
For ‘the problem’ does not lie fundamentally with the self-harmer 
herself, but with the context of suffering, adversity and oppression in 
which women who self-harm are typically situated. 14 
 Alongside supporting and empowering women to choose self-care 
over self-harm, effectively and ethically addressing self-harm there-
fore requires challenging psycho-socio-economic contexts that harm 
women. The basic tenet of any broadly liberal society, that respect 
and equality are ideally due to all persons irrespective of who they are, 
supports this wider social and political agenda for change for people of 
all genders: we must address suffering, adversity and oppression. Such 
an agenda for change may be preventive with respect to self-harm on a 
large scale: associations are not the same as causes, but nonetheless, we 
should expect that addressing some of the known risk factors may have 
an impact on rates of self-harm. But it is also important for enabling 
individual women who self-harm to successfully stop: clinical interven-
tions are significantly less likely to be effective if women leave clinical 
contexts only to return to psycho-socio-economic contexts in which 
they are again subjected to inequality and injustice, and which therefore 
re-enact and reinforce precisely the mind-set and habits that clinical 
interventions aim to change. 
 Hence, effectively and ethically addressing self-harm, as well arguably 
as other-directed violence, requires working with individuals alongside 
working to change wider social and political systems. But I want to 
conclude by briefly commenting on how, at a broad cultural level, what 
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needs to change may include our cultural attitudes towards anger with 
respect to both men and women: it may not only be inequality and 
injustice that need to be addressed, but also our tendency to condemn 
and suppress people’s emotions. 
 In contemporary culture, anger is viewed as natural in men, but so 
too is aggression and violence – indeed, there may be few non-aggres-
sive and non-violent socially acceptable models of behaviour avail-
able to men to deal with angry feelings. For women, in contrast, anger 
itself – never mind the aggression and violence it can prompt – may be 
treated as unnatural and indeed unacceptable: anger may be thought 
‘unbecoming’ in ‘the gentle sex’. An alternative and opposing cultural 
outlook maintains that anger – no doubt alongside other difficult 
emotions, such as shame and fear – and the aggression and violence 
it drives is natural for all people of all genders, especially when we 
find ourselves in contexts where we have been harmed. If that harm 
is perpetrated by others through mistreatment, neglect of our needs, 
outright violation and abuse, or other forms of disrespect, subjugation 
or inequality, we may feel angry and want to be aggressive or violent 
towards the perpetrators. If the harm is more a product of bad luck 
or wider social and political circumstances, lacking an identifiable and 
responsible agent, we may yet feel angry and want to be aggressive and 
violent in a more inchoate or undirected way, and understandably so. 
Either way, anger and the propensity for aggression and violence are 
natural human responses to harm and wrongdoing – found in people 
of all genders equally. 
 But in addition to differential treatment of men and women, contem-
porary culture seems also to fail in general to draw a clear distinction, 
with respect to all people, between anger and other difficult emotions on 
the one hand, and the behaviour that these emotions can drive on the 
other. In men, anger, aggression and violence may be accepted, but all 
equally condemned as wrong. In women, anger, aggression and violence 
are not accepted but culturally suppressed, as well as condemned as 
wrong. But an alternative and opposing cultural outlook maintains 
that, to the contrary, with respect people of all genders, there is nothing 
wrong with  feeling angry or indeed feeling any other difficult emotion – 
even if it is indeed often wrong  to act aggressively or violently. 
 This alternative outlook is in fact realized in clinical and other 
contexts that are designed to heal wounds or resolve conflicts: the need 
to acknowledge, validate and tolerate anger and other difficult emotions 
is recognized as crucial, in order to enable people who have been harmed 
to feel respected, cared for, and that their experience of suffering or 
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mistreatment is recognized and taken seriously by others. 15 So too, as 
part of a process of validation and tolerance, is providing people with 
authentic means of expression, communication and action in relation to 
such feelings, as alternatives to aggression and violence. 16 Contemporary 
culture notwithstanding, the existence of such contexts and practices 
establishes that it is possible for people to speak their anger and show 
how they feel, without resorting to aggression and violence. Especially 
when situated within psycho-socio-economic contexts of suffering and 
oppression, anger is understandable and legitimate. Perhaps if anger and 
other difficult emotions were better validated and tolerated in our wider 
culture, with respect to people of all genders, it would be more possible 
for all of us to find means of expressing, communicating and acting on 
our feelings, such that we resorted to violence – whether other-directed 
and self-directed – less. 17 
 Notes 
 1 .  It is both interesting and potentially clinically useful to consider whether these 
latter sorts of behaviours represent ways in which men are able to self-harm 
in our culture, under the more socially accepted masculine guise of other-
directed aggression and violence.  Fight Club, the film adaptation of Chuck 
Palahniuk’s novel of the same name, arguably presents male fighting in this 
light. 
 2 .  It is important to distinguish what has been labelled ‘reactive’ or ‘hot’ violence, 
from what has been labelled ‘instrumental’ or ‘cold and calculating’ violence 
and which is associated with psychopathy. For discussion of this distinction 
and the empirical data supporting it, see e.g. Blair et al. 2005, Howell 2009, 
and Raine 2013. My focus in this article is on ‘reactive’ or ‘hot’ violence as 
opposed to psychopathic violence. However, the labelling is unfortunate, as 
reactive violence is also instrumental, in the sense of serving various functions 
or ends, as discussed above. 
 3 .  For an important discussion of the difference between rational deliberation 
and choice, see Holton 2006. Pickard 2015 offers a more detailed discus-
sion of deliberation and choice in self-directed and other-directed violence 
committed by people with personality disorder, in relation to both mental 
health and criminal law. 
 4 .  For further discussion of this form of argument, especially in relation to the 
nature of addiction on the one hand, and personality disorder, and criminal 
law on the other, see Pickard 2012, 2013a, 2013b, and 2015. 
 5 .  Holton and Schute 2007 draw on philosophy and psychology to understand 
the nature of loss of control and link it to the older defence of provocation in 
English law. Although this defence was abolished and replaced with a loss of 
self-control defence under The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 Sections 54–6, 
which widens the emotions relevant to the defence, Holton and Schute’s 
discussion of the philosophy and psychology is yet relevant. See too Horder 
2005 for discussion of the role of fear alongside anger in loss of self-control. 
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 6 .  Note that a history of childhood physical abuse is associated with other-
directed violence in men, while a history of childhood sexual abuse is associ-
ated with self-directed violence in women (Waxman et al. 2013). 
 7 .  See Motz 2009a for an excellent recent collection of articles about self-harm, 
particularly in relation to forensic contexts. See too Motz 2008, especially 
chapter 6, and the NICE Guidelines 2011 for longer-term management of 
self-harm. There are also an increasing number of patient self-reports avail-
able online and in medical textbooks and guidelines. Hawton et al. 2012 is 
a comprehensive review of medical and social science studies of self-harm 
in adolescents. See Klonsky 2007 for a review of the evidence outlining the 
functions of self-harm. 
 8 .  For discussion, see Pickard 2013a and 2013b. 
 9 .  First-person report, quoted in Motz 2009a, 47. 
 10 .  Interestingly, the claim that self-harm is not morally wrong can be found 
within the philosophical literature on ethics. Cf. Pritchard: ‘It may be noted 
that if the badness of pain were the reason why we ought not to inflict pain 
on another, it would equally be a reason why we ought not to inflict pain 
on ourselves; and yet, though we should allow the wanton infliction of pain 
on ourselves to be foolish, we should not think of describing it as wrong’ 
(1912 [1949], 5). Cf. too Slote: ‘ordinary moral thinking seems to involve an 
asymmetry regarding what an agent is permitted to do to himself and what 
he is permitted to do to others. If one can easily prevent someone else’s pain, 
it is typically thought wrong not to do so, but not to avoid similar pain in 
oneself ( ... or indeed, to inflict it we might add ... ) is only lazy, crazy, or sense-
less, not wrong’ (1984, 181). Note that, in addition to denying the immo-
rality of self-harm, both these philosophers also characterize it – in keeping 
with its conception as pathological or sick – as foolish, crazy, and senseless. 
 11 .  For the classic statement of this liberal position, see Dworkin 1977 and 1985. 
 12 .  For a classic discussion of the principles of working effectively with self-
harm, see Tantum and Whittaker 1993. Lawday 2009 and Grocutt 2009 are 
excellent discussions of self-harm cessation in secure settings, applicable to 
non-secure settings too. The NICE Guidelines 2004 and 2011 as well as Wood 
et al. 2014 also offer invaluable resources. 
 13 .  For discussion of the role of narrative in effective therapeutic processes, see 
Pickard 2014. 
 14 .  For further discussion of the distinction between responsibility and blame, 
in theory and in practice, alongside other themes of this section see Pickard 
2011 and 2013b, and Lacey and Pickard 2013. The importance of psycho-
socio-economic context is also emphasized by feminist theories of relational 
autonomy, which argue that in such conditions, autonomy is impaired. Stoljar 
2014 offers an excellent survey of the extensive literature; see Benson 1994 
and Govier 1993 for discussions particularly relevant to issues arising in rela-
tion to self-harm, because of their focus on how oppression impacts on self-
worth and self-trust, understood as a precondition of autonomy. However, to 
grant that such conditions impair autonomy does not change the fact that, 
from a pragmatic perspective, effective means of addressing self-harm need 
to work with the self-harmer’s own rational agency as well as acknowledging 
and addressing psycho-socio-economic context. For irrespective of the impact 
of these conditions on autonomy, they do not nullify rational agency, which 
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is therefore a powerful and essential resource for women who self-harm, as it 
is for others who are subject to oppression of various forms. 
 15 .  Important non-clinical examples arguably include some forms of Restorative 
Justice Congress as well as the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. For discussion of the role of emotions in restorative justice 
practices, see Rossner 2013. 
 16 .  The non-violent communication skills developed by Marshall Rosenberg 
and used for conflict resolution, mediation and peacekeeping constitute an 
internationally recognized example of such a practice. Rosenberg has written 
many books describing the techniques and benefits of non-violent commu-
nication, but for an introduction which relates it in particular to the valida-
tion and toleration of anger, see his 2005. 
 17 .  I am grateful to Anna Motz, Ian Phillips and Amia Srinivasan for discussion 
of the themes of this paper. This research is funded by the Wellcome Trust 
[grant number 090768]. 
 References 
 Beauvoir de, S. 1949 [1989].  The Second Sex. New York: Knopf. 
 Benson, P. 1994. ‘Free agency and self-worth’,  Journal of Philosophy , 91, 650–668. 
 Blair, J., Mitchell, D. and Blair, K. 2005.  The Psychopath: Emotion and the Brain . 
Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
 Canetto, S.S. and Sakinofsky, I. 1998. ‘The gender paradox in suicide’,  Suicide and 
Life-Threatening Behaviour , 28, 1–23. 
 Dworkin, R. 1977.  Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 Dworkin, R. 1985.  A Matter of Principle . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 Favazza, A. 1987.  Bodies under Siege. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
 Fincham, B., Langer, S., Scourfield, J., and Shiner, M. 2011.  Understanding Suicide: 
A Sociological Autopsy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 Flannery, D.J., Vazsonyi, A.T., and Waldman, I.D. 2007.  The Cambridge Handbook 
of Violent Behaviour and Aggression. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 Freud, A. 1936 [1992].  The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence . London: Karnac 
Books. 
 Govier, T. 1993. ‘Self-trust, autonomy, and self-esteem’,  Hypatia , 8, 99–120. 
 Grocutt, E. 2009. ‘Self-harm Cessation in Secure Settings’ in A. Motz (ed.)  Managing 
Self-harm: Psychological Perspectives. Hove: Routledge, 180–203. 
 Hawton, K., Linsell, L., Adeniji, T., Sariaslan, A., and Fazel, S. 2014. ‘Self-harm 
in prisons in England and Wales: an epidemiological study of prevalence, risk 
factors, clustering and subsequent suicide’,  The Lancet , 383, 1147–1154. 
 Hawton, K., Saunders, K.E.A., and O’Connor, R.C. 2012. ‘Self-harm and suicide in 
adolescents’,  The Lancet , 379, 2373–2382. 
 Heitmeyer, W., and Hagan, J. 2003.  The International Handbook of Violence Research. 
The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 Holton, R. 2006. ‘The act of choice’,  Philosophers’ Imprint , 6, 1–15. 
 Holton, R. and Shute, S. 2007. ‘Self-control in the modern provocation defence’, 
 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies , 27, 49–74. 
Self-Harm as Violence 89
 Horder, J. 2005. ‘Reshaping the subjective element in the provocation defence’, 
 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies , 25, 123–140. 
 Howells, K. 2009. ‘Angry Affect, Aggression, and Personality Disorder’ in M. 
McMurran and R.C. Howard (eds.)  Personality, Personality Disorder, and Violence. 
Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 191–212. 
 Kerkhof, A.J.F.M, Schmidtke, A., and Bille-Brahe, U. 1994.  Attempted Suicide in 
Europe: Findings from the Multicentre Study on Parasuicide by the WHO Regional 
Office for Europe. Leiden: DSWO Press. 
 Kerr, P.L., Muehlenkamp, J.J., and Turner, J.M. 2010. ‘Nonsuicidal self-injury: A 
review of current research for family medicine and primary care physicians’, 
 American Board of Family Medicine , 23, 240–259. 
 Klonsky, E.D. 2007. ‘The functions of deliberate self-injury: a review of the 
evidence’,  Clinical Psychological Review, 27, 226–239. 
 Krug, E.G., Dahlberg, L.L., Mercy, J.A., Zwi, A.B, and Lozano, R. 2002.  World Report 
on Violence and Health. Geneva: World Health Organization. 
 Lacey, N., and Pickard, H. 2013. ‘From the consulting room to the court room? 
Taking the clinical model of responsibility without blame into the legal realm’, 
 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies , 33, 1–29. 
 Lawday, R. 2009. ‘Self-Harm in Women’s Secure Services: Reflections and Strategies 
for Treatment Design’ in A. Motz (ed.)  Managing Self-harm: Psychological 
Perspectives. Hove: Routledge, 157–179. 
 Mental Health Foundation (MHF). 2007.  The Fundamental Facts. London, UK : 
MHF. 
 Motz, A. 2008.  The Psychology of Female Violence: Crimes against the Body . Hove: 
Routledge. 
 Motz, A. (ed.) 2009a.  Managing Self-harm: Psychological Perspectives . Hove: Routledge. 
 Motz, A. 2009b. ‘Self-harm as a Sign of Hope’, in A. Motz (ed.)  Managing Self-harm: 
Psychological Perspectives. Hove: Routledge, 15–41. 
 National Institute for Clinical Excellence. 2004.  Self-Harm: The Short-Term Physical 
and Psychological Management and Secondary Prevention of Self-Harm in Primary 
and Secondary Care (CG 16). London: NICE. 
 National Institute for Clinical Excellence. 2011.  Self-Harm: Longer-Term Management 
(CG 133). London: NICE. 
 Pickard, H. 2011. ‘Responsibility without blame: empathy and the effective treat-
ment of personality disorder’,  Philosophy, Psychiatry, Psychology , 18, 209–233. 
 Pickard, H. 2012. ‘The purpose in chronic addiction’,  American Journal of Bioethics 
Neuroscience , 3, 40–49. 
 Pickard, H. 2013a. ‘Psychopathology and the ability to do otherwise’,  Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research. First published online 8 April 2013. DOI:10.1111/
phpr.12025. 
 Pickard, H. 2013b. ‘Responsibility without Blame: Philosophical Reflections 
on Clinical Practice’ in K.W.M. Fulford, M. Davies, R.T. Gipps, G. Graham, J. 
Sadler, G. Strangellini, and T. Thornton (eds)  The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy 
of Psychiatry . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1134–1152. 
 Pickard, H. 2014. ‘Stories of Recovery: The Role of Narrative and Hope 
in Overcoming PTSD and PD’ in J.Z Sadler, K.W.M. Fulford, C.W. van 
Staden (eds)  The Oxford Handbook of Psychiatric Ethics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. Online Publication Date: October 2014. DOI: 10.1093/
oxfordhb/9780198732365.013.30. 
90 Hanna Pickard
 Pickard, H. 2015. ‘Choice, deliberation, violence: mental capacity and criminal 
responsibility in personality disorder’,  International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 
40, 15–24. 
 Pritchard, H.A. 1912 [1949]. ‘Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake?’ In  Moral 
Obligation: Essays and Lectures . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1–17. 
 Raine, A. 2013.  The Anatomy of Violence: The Biological Roots of Crime . London: 
Penguin. 
 Rosenberg, M. 2005.  The Surprising Purpose of Anger – Beyond Anger Management: 
Finding the Gift. Encinitas CA: PuddleDancer Press. 
 Rossner, M. 2013.  Just Emotions: Rituals of Restorative Justice . Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 Schrijvers, D. 2012. ‘The gender paradox in suicidal behavior and its impact on 
the suicidal process’,  Journal of Affective Disorders , 138, 19–26. 
 Slote, M. 1984. ‘Morality and self-other asymmetry’,  Journal of Philosophy , 81, 
179–192. 
 Stoljar, N. 2014. Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy.  The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition). E.N. Zalta (ed.) Available at:  http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/feminism-autonomy/ . 
 Tantum, D., and Whittaker, J. 1993. ‘Self-Wounding and Personality Disorder’ 
in P. Tyrer and G. Stein (eds.)  Personality Disorder Reviewed . London: Gaskell, 
191–224. 
 Waxman, R., Fenton, M.C., Skodol, A.E., Grant, B.F., and Hasin, D. 2014. 
‘Childhood maltreatment and personality disorders in the USA: Specificity of 
effects and the impact of gender’,  Personality and Mental Health , 8, 30–41. 
 
Except where otherwise noted, this chapter is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view 
a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
